Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection

> Return address Postbus 16001 2500 BA Den Haag

Dr. Jean-Claude SCHMIT
Directeur de la santé
LE GOUVERNEMENT DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE LUXEMBOURG
Ministère de la Santé
Direction de la Santé
Allée Marconi - Villa Louvigny
L-2120 Luxembourg

Autoriteit Nucleaire Veiligheid en Stralingsbescherming
ANVS
Beleid en Regelgeving

Den Haag
Postbus 16001
2500 BA Den Haag

Contact

Date 6 June 2017
Subject Resolution endorsed by Dutch Parliament

Ref:
ANVS-2017/6941

Dear Mr. Schmit,

I am writing to you because last week the Dutch parliament endorsed a "resolution" requesting the Dutch government to join Germany en Luxembourg in their request to the Belgian government to close down the Tihange NPP[1].

The safety of nuclear power plants in Belgium is an important issue for the Dutch government. Many citizens and local authorities in the south of our country are concerned because of the perceived nuclear safety situation and the fact that Belgian nuclear power plants are located near the border with the Netherlands.

The safety of the plants and the public concerns are regularly discussed between both countries, both at government level and between regulators. Based on the information provided by FANC, the Belgian regulator, on the actual safety of the power plants, the Dutch government has to date seen no reason to request the Belgian authorities to close down one or more power plants.

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[1] Courtesy translation of the resolution:
The House, [...]
observing that the Belgian nuclear power plant in Tihange must frequently shut down due to safety issues; whereas the construction of the nuclear power plant in Tihange provided for a phase-wise closure of the various units, with closure taking place in the period 2005 to 2015; whereas the oldest units of the nuclear power station should have been closed more than eleven years ago; observing that the Director of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) in letters of 1 July 2016 and 1 September 2016 criticized the safety policy at Tihange nuclear power plant and that the director confirmed this criticism in November 2016 in various Walloon and Flemish media;
whereas in case of a nuclear disaster in Tihange the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg are severely affected;
whereas Germany and Luxembourg have requested the Belgian government to close down the nuclear reactors in Tihange for safety reasons;
calls on the Dutch Government, to join Germany and Luxembourg and urge the Belgian Government to close the Tihange nuclear power plant

Autoriteit Nucleaire Veiligheid en Stralingsbescherming
ANVS
Beleid en Regelgeving

Date
6 June 2017

Now that the Dutch parliament urges to join the government of Germany and Luxembourg in their request to close down Tihange, I am looking for more and precise information about the position of your government.

In particular I would appreciate getting your answer to the following questions:

- What is the position of your government regarding the safety of the Belgian nuclear power plants in general and Tihange in particular?
- What is the exact request of your government to the Belgian government? And how did you communicate it?
- On what grounds is the request based (technical, political, general concerns?) and what is the purpose of it?
- Can you provide us some information about any legal analysis you performed, as a basis of the German request to close down plants in a different country?

Your information will be very helpful in determining the position of the Dutch government.

If you need more information or in case you have any question or further inquiry, please do not hesitate to contact us

I trust you can send your answer before the end of June. Thank you in advance for your answer.

Best regards,

DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,

C.F. Kuijpers

LE GOUVERNEMENT
DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE LUXEMBOURG
Ministère de la Santé

Direction de la santé

Your reference: ANVS-2017/6941
Our reference: pm/drp 17/07-017
File followed by: Patrick Majerus

Autoriteit Nucleaire Veiligheid en
Stralingbescherming

Director General for the Environment and
International Affairs
M. C.B.F. Kuijpers

Den Haag
Postbus 16001
2500 BA Den Haag

Luxembourg, 13 July 2017

Subject: Resolution endorsed by Dutch Parliament

Dear Mr. Kuijpers,

The decision by the Belgian authorities to grant permission for the restart of the reactors Tihange- 2 and Doel-3 in November 2015 raised concern in Luxembourg, both within the population and at the political level.

Under these circumstances, on 22 April 2016 the Government in Council discussed the issue and took the position at the highest political level to align itself with the Germany request to temporary shutdown the concerned reactors to enable additional tests. The conclusion of this discussion was inserted into the press release issued after the meeting[1]. On the other hand, our Government has not taken any other concrete steps to follow-up the request; neither did it perform a legal analyse with regard to the Belgian case.

Between the restart of the reactors and the political statement, however several exchanges have taken place between Belgium and Luxembourg, as follows:

- My department of radiation protection (DRP) has participated at the technical seminar from 11 to 12 January 2016, organized by the Belgian authority. From that seminar, my experts got the impression that the various studies have been done in a comprehensible way. Even though the discussions revealed differences in the interpretations of the remaining safety margins related to uncertainties in embrittlement, my experts have not

[1] Courtesy translation of the text: "The Council decided to align itself with the German Government's position to ask the Belgian Government to temporarily close the two nuclear reactors Doel 3 and Tihange 2 as long as new safety investigations are not carried out".

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identified sufficient weaknesses that would enable us to put the Belgian position into question. Given however the limited expertise available in our country and since Germany has announced to further analyse the technical details, a position was taken to wait for these further elements.

- On 18 January 2016, a delegation of parliamentarians and representatives of the civil society, led by the Secretary of State at the ministry of environment, have met the Belgian Ministers, Mrs. Marie-Christine Marghem and Mr. Jan Jambon in Brussels. The Belgian side demonstrated openness in the exchanges and understanding for the concerns raised, but also clearly confirmed their confidence in the analysis made under the umbrella of FANC.
- Based on an agreement from 2011, we have held annual bilateral meetings with FANC, and visited the nuclear power plant Tihange on 6th April 2016. Those meetings help us to better understand the various issues related to nuclear safety in Belgium.
- Information exchange has also taken place between the DRP and the German BMUB between January and April 2016. In particular the technical assessments were shared. However the Government has not asked our experts to issue an opinion on those assessments.

I sincerely hope that these answers will be useful for your further steps.

With kind regards,

Dr. Jean-Claude Schmit
Director of Health

Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection

> Return address Postbus 16001 2500 BA Den Haag

Director General
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Robert-Schuman-Platz 3
53175 Bonn
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Autoriteit Nucleaire Veiligheid en Stralingsbescherming
ANVS
Beleid en Regelgeving

Den Haag
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2500 BA Den Haag

Contact

Date 6 June 2017
Subject Resolution endorsed by Dutch Parliament

Ref:
ANVS-2017/6943

Dear Mr. Cloosters,

I am writing to you because last week the Dutch parliament endorsed a "resolution" requesting the Dutch government to join Germany en Luxembourg in their request to the Belgian government to close down the Tihange NPP[1].

The safety of nuclear power plants in Belgium is an important issue for the Dutch government. Many citizens and local authorities in the south of our country are concerned because of the perceived nuclear safety situation and the fact that Belgian nuclear power plants are located near the border with the Netherlands.

The safety of the plants and the public concerns are regularly discussed between both countries, both at government level and between regulators. Based on the information provided by FANC, the Belgian regulator, on the actual safety of the power plants, the Dutch government has to date seen no reason to request the Belgian authorities to close down one or more power plants.

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[1] Courtesy translation of the resolution:
The House, [...]
observing that the Belgian nuclear power plant in Tihange must frequently shut down due to safety issues; whereas the construction of the nuclear power plant in Tihange provided for a phase-wise closure of the various units, with closure taking place in the period 2005 to 2015; whereas the oldest units of the nuclear power station should have been closed more than eleven years ago; observing that the Director of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) in letters of 1 July 2016 and 1 September 2016 criticized the safety policy at Tihange nuclear power plant and that the director confirmed this criticism in November 2016 in various Walloon and Flemish media;
whereas in case of a nuclear disaster in Tihange the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg are severely affected;
whereas Germany and Luxembourg have requested the Belgian government to close down the nuclear reactors in Tihange for safety reasons;
calls on the Dutch Government, to join Germany and Luxembourg and urge the Belgian Government to close the Tihange nuclear power plant

Autoriteit Nucleaire Veiligheid en Stralingsbescherming
ANVS
Beleid en Regelgeving

Date
6 June 2017

Now that the Dutch parliament urges to join the government of Germany and Luxembourg in their request to close down Tihange, I am looking for more and precise information about the position of your government.

In particular I would appreciate getting your answer to the following questions:

- What is the position of your government regarding the safety of the Belgian nuclear power plants in general and Tihange in particular?
- What is the exact request of your government to the Belgian government? And how did you communicate it?
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- Can you provide us some information about any legal analysis you performed, as a basis of the German request to close down plants in a different country?

Your information will be very helpful in determining the position of the Dutch government.

If you need more information or in case you have any question or further inquiry, please do not hesitate to contact us

I trust you can send your answer before the end of June. Thank you in advance for your answer.

Best regards,

DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,

C.B.F. Kuijpers

Federal Ministry for the
Environment, Nature Conservation,
Building and Nuclear Safety

G20 GERMANY 2017
HAMBURG

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Dr. Wolfgang Cloosters
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Resolution endorsed by the Dutch Parliament regarding Belgian NPPs
Your letter of 6 June 2017; your reference: ANVS-2017/6943
Reference: RS I 4 - 18231NDL/1

Bonn, 29.06.2017

Dear Mr. Kuijpers,

Thank you for your letter of 6 June 2017, informing me about the recent resolution of the Dutch Parliament, which calls on the Dutch government to join Germany and Luxembourg and urge the Belgian government to close the Tihange nuclear power plant.

I greatly appreciate your support in this regard and I am happy to provide you with some background information about the position of BMUB regarding the analyses of the findings in Tihange-2 and Doel-3 by Electrabel and FANC as well as our steps in this regard so far.

Since the discovery of flaw indications in 2012, BMUB has closely followed the evolution of the analysis. In the following years German experts both from the BMUB and from its independent advisory board, the Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) have participated actively in the technical discussion in the frame of several meetings and especially in two international workshops organised by FANC. During the workshops BMUB presented its technical position and raised several technical issues. Based on all officially

...

available information BMUB has commissioned the RSK in March 2016 for their independent position in assessing the soundness of the safety cases with respect to the integrity of the reactor pressure vessels of the Doel-3 and Tihange-2 nuclear power plants. In a bilateral meeting between German and Belgian experts in-depth discussions were held on technical details of this assessment. While acknowledging the conclusiveness of the approach chosen in the safety assessment, the RSK raised unresolved questions. The flaw indications require an integrity assessment using fracture-mechanical calculation models. Regarding the calculations models, there are still unresolved questions especially with respect to the experimental verification of the models and the consideration of the anisotropy of the material. Please find in the annex a detailed explanation of unresolved questions, which were raised with Belgian experts (available only in German). In its conclusion the RSK stressed the need of further proofs, both by experiment and by analyses, to confirm that the required safety margins are complied with.

On the basis of the statement of the RSK Minister Hendricks asked the Belgian Minister of Security and the Interior in April 2016 to shut down those two reactors in the interim, at least until the further analyses have been finalised. The communication took place in a phone call between the Belgian Minister Jambon and our State Secretary Flasbarth acting for Minister Hendricks who was overseas at the time. On various occasions since, this issue has been taken up.

When Minister Hendricks asked for the at least temporary shutdown of the two reactors, this was based on the aforementioned statement of our advisors of the RSK and therefore based on technical concerns. The great public

concern, in particular in the bordering region around Aachen, obviously also has political implications.

Please note, that deliberately there was no *demand* for a shutdown. According to our rough legal analysis according to the facts at that time we saw no legal basis to demand a shutdown. Based on the current assessment of the technical facts and the unresolved questions and different technical position of our experts that remain, this assessment is still valid. Besides this legal perspective we have obviously also taken into account the foreign policy aspect and believe that a diplomatic and cooperative approach is preferable.

Finally, I would like to mention that with regard to the unresolved questions and different technical position of our experts, it was agreed at the recent first meeting of the Belgian-German Nuclear Commission that Belgian and German expert of the RSK would meet to discuss the questions and different technical position that German experts still have.

The safety of the two reactor pressure vessels will certainly continue to be a priority issue for us and we would welcome cooperation with you in this regard, possibly even together with Luxembourg. From my point of view a trilateral letter by the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany singed by the responsible Ministries could be a good way forward.

Yours sincerely,

Anlage
Offene Fragen zum Integritätsnachweis der Reaktordruckbehälter der Kernkraftwerke Doel-3 und Tihange-2 nach dem deutsch-belgischen bilateralen Treffen vom 05. April 2016

Die Befunde in den Reaktordruckbehältern erfordern einen Integritätsnachweis unter Anwendung bruchmechanischer Berechnungsmodelle. Auch unter Berücksichtigung der Ergebnisse des deutsch-belgischen bilateralen Treffens vom 05. April 2016 sind folgende Punkte offen geblieben:

- Bruchmechanische Bewertung der Rissfelder unter Berücksichtigung der Anisotropie des Werkstoffs und der Nachweisgrenzen der zerstörungsfreien Prüfverfahren (zfP)
- Lastannahmen und Randbedingungen für Notkühltransienten
- Eigenspannungen im Grundwerkstoff unterhalb der Plattierung
- Tragfähigkeitsnachweis nach ASME BPVC, Section III

Das Beratungsgremium des BMUB, die Reaktorsicherheitskommission (RSK), hat in ihrer Sitzung in Form einer vorläufigen Kurzbewertung am 13. April 2016 Stellung genommen [1]. Die offenen Punkte werden im Rahmen des weiteren Beratungsprozesses detailliert aufbereitet.

Vorläufige Darstellung der offenen Punkte:

1 Bruchmechanische Bewertung der Rissfelder unter Berücksichtigung der Anisotropie des Werkstoffs und der Nachweisgrenzen der zfP.

- Fehlende Absicherung der bisher verwendeten Berechnungsmodelle durch aussagekräftige experimentelle Untersuchungen für die maßgeblichen Beanspruchungszustände, insbesondere mehrachsige mechanische und thermische Beanspruchungen, die bei Notkühltransienten auftreten.

- Der Einfluss der Anisotropie des Werkstoffs in den Seigerungszonen auf die Rissbeanspruchung und die Interaktion zwischen den Einzelrissen eines Rissfeldes wird in dem verwendeten Berechnungsmodell eines einhüllenden Einzelrisses in einem als isotrop angenommenen Werkstoffvolumen nicht berücksichtigt.

- Das bisher verwendete Berechnungsmodell berücksichtigt nicht die möglicherweise vorhandenen, durch ZfP nicht erkennbaren Querverbindungen (Brücken) zwischen den Rissen innerhalb eines Rissfeldes. Mögliche Querverbindungen haben für die Integritätsbewertung eine hohe Bedeutung, da sie ein mögliches Risswachstum wesentlich beeinflussen können. Darüber hinaus wurden bisher mögliche existierende abgeschattete Risse sowie mögliche treppenförmige Rissverläufe, die nicht durch ZfP erkennbar sind, nicht berücksichtigt.

- Bei der Bestimmung der lokalen Rissbeanspruchung entlang der Rissfront durch das J-Integral sind, bei Verwendung der üblichen Methode der virtuellen Risserweiterung, Annahmen zur Richtung der virtuellen Risserweiterung erforderlich. Diese Annahmen können die Ergebnisse wesentlich beeinflussen. Für die zu betrachtenden Risslagen wurden bisher keine ausreichenden Untersuchungen zur Bestimmung des maximalen lokalen J-Integrals durchgeführt.

2 Lastannahmen und Randbedingungen für Notkühltransienten.

Bei den betrachteten Notkühltransienten wird davon ausgegangen, dass eine rotationssymmetrische Temperaturverteilung im Ringraum eine konservative Annahme darstellt. Asymmetrische Strähnen-Streifenkühlung (so wie sie im RDB bei solchen Transienten zu erwarten sind) wurde nicht betrachtet. Experimentell und analytisch wurde nachgewiesen, dass sich bei derartiger Belastung eine andere Hauptbeanspruchungsrichtung einstellt und sich z. B. für umfangsorientierte postulierte oberflächennahe Fehler im Bereich der Core-Naht höhere Rissbeanspruchungen ergeben können als bei einer rotationssymmetrischen Temperaturverteilung.

3 Eigenspannungen im Grundwerkstoff unterhalb der Plattierung

- Experimentelle Analysen an original Reaktordruckbehälter-Bauteilen bei der MPA Universität Stuttgart weisen auch nach der Spannungsarmglühung im Anschluss an die Plattierungsschweißung nicht vernachlässigbare Eigenspannungen (bis zu 200 MPa Zugspannungen) im Bereich der Wärmeeinflusszone des Grundwerkstoffs auf. Wie sich solche Eigenspannungen, insbesondere bei Notkühltransienten, auf das Verhalten eines Rissfeldes auswirken, wurde in der Nachweisführung für die Reaktordruckbehälter der Anlagen Doel-3 und Tihange-2 bisher nicht untersucht.

4 Tragfähigkeitsnachweis nach ASME BPVC, Section III

- Der Tragfähigkeitsnachweis nach ASME BPVC, Section III geht von einem rissfreien Bauteil aus. Die im Nachweisgang gewählte Vorgehensweise zur Ermittlung einer Kollapslast („plastic analysis collapse load") unter Einbeziehung von Rissen stellt eine Erweiterung des Anwendungsbereichs der ASME Vorgehensweise dar, die durch entsprechende experimentelle Untersuchungen validiert werden sollte.

- Das zugrundeliegende Werkstoffmodell berücksichtigt nicht das bruchmechanische Verhalten eines Bauteils mit Rissen und überschätzt grundsätzlich das Verformungsvermögen der rissbehafteten Struktur. Dies gilt insbesondere für die hier vorliegende überwiegende Schubbeanspruchung der Risse und deren Interaktion innerhalb eines Rissfeldes. Darüber hinaus gelten auch hierfür die offenen Fragestellungen unter Punkt 1.
In diesem Zusammenhang wäre zu zeigen, dass noch eine ausreichende Tragfähigkeit des RDB für primäre Beanspruchungen nachgewiesen werden kann.

Fazit der RSK [1]:

Aufgrund der umfangreichen Untersuchungen und geführten Nachweise zu den RDB Doel-3 und Tihange-2 sowie der vorliegenden Erkenntnisse aus Forschungsvorhaben im Rahmen der Reaktorsicherheitsforschung in Deutschland kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass unter Betriebsbelastungen ein Integritätsverlust der drucktragenden Wand der RDB nicht zu unterstellen ist.

Bezüglich der Störfallbelastung ist aufgrund der oben genannten offenen Fragen für die RSK nicht nachvollziehbar, dass die hierfür geforderten und in den Nachweisen ausgewiesenen Sicherheitsabstände tatsächlich erreicht werden.

Um zu bestätigen, dass die erforderlichen Sicherheitsabstände eingehalten werden, bedarf es weiterer Nachweise sowohl experimenteller als auch analytischer Art. Hier ist von besonderer Bedeutung die Verifizierung der Konservativität der Anwendung des Ersatzfehlers für Rissfelder in anisotropen Werkstoffbereichen bei Störfällen mit mehrachsigen Beanspruchungen.

Aus heutiger Sicht gibt es keine konkreten Hinweise, dass die Sicherheitsabstände aufgezehrt sind. Es kann aber auch nicht bestätigt werden, dass diese sicher eingehalten werden.

Referenz:

[1] Anlage 1 zum Ergebnisprotokoll der 483. Sitzung der Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission (RSK) am 13. April 2016 (www.bmub.bund.de/N52994/)

Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu

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Vice-eerste minister van Veiligheid en Binnenlandse Zaken
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Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu

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Ons kenmerk
ANVS-2017/7054

Datum 13 JUNI 2017
Betreft Informatie over motie Nederlands parlement

Geachte heer Jambon,

De afgelopen periode hebben wij elkaar meerdere malen gesproken over nucleaire veiligheid en gevoelens van onrust in Nederland. Met deze brief wil ik u informeren over de jongste ontwikkelingen.

In het zuiden van Nederland en in het Nederlandse parlement houdt de onrust omtrent de veiligheid van kerncentrales in België aan. Dit naar aanleiding van aanhoudende berichtgeving in zowel de Belgische als Nederlandse media over diverse storingen en ontwikkelingen in de Belgische kerncentrales die zich in de nabijheid van Nederland bevinden.

In de overleggen met het Nederlandse parlement heb ik steeds gemeld de ontwikkelingen in België nauwgezet te volgen en met u een transparante wederzijdse informatie-uitwisseling te onderhouden. Daarbij heb ik ook aangegeven dat nucleaire veiligheid een nationale bevoegdheid is. Ook onze onafhankelijke diensten FANC en ANVS informeren elkaar voortdurend en zij werken aan een verdere uitbouw van de samenwerking, die zal leiden tot een actualisering van het bestaande memorandum van overeenstemming. Bij de informatieverwerving over de veiligheid van de Belgische kerncentrales betrek ik ook de bevindingen van internationale *peer review* missies in België. Op grond van de mij uit deze bronnen beschikbare informatie heb ik geen indicatie dat de veiligheid van de Belgische kerncentrales in het geding is en dat ik tot sluiting zou moeten oproepen.

Het Nederlandse parlement heeft onlangs een motie aangenomen, waarin de regering wordt verzocht "om zich aan te sluiten bij Duitsland en Luxemburg en de Belgische regering dringend te verzoeken de kerncentrale in Tihange te sluiten". De volledige tekst van de motie treft u in bijlage aan.

Ter uitvoering van de motie, wordt nu bij Duitsland en Luxemburg op ambtelijk niveau informatie ingewonnen over de stappen die de Duitse en de Luxemburgse regeringen *de facto* hebben genomen richting de Belgische regering. Er wordt gevraagd of een verzoek door de respectievelijke regeringen is gedaan aan de Belgische regering en wat daarvan de precieze inhoud was, alsmede op welke gronden het eventuele verzoek was gebaseerd.

Mocht u naar aanleiding van het bovenstaande nadere informatie wensen, dan ben ik daartoe graag beschikbaar. Ik zal u op de hoogte houden van verdere ontwikkelingen.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN INFRASTRUCTUUR EN MILIEU,

mw. drs. M.H. Schultz van Haegen

Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu

Ons kenmerk
ANVS-2017/7054

Vice-Eerste Minister
Minister van Veiligheid en Binnenlandse Zaken

Aan mw. Drs. M.H. Schultz van Haegen
Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu
Plesmanweg 1-6
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Uw contactpersoon	T	Uw referentie	Bijlage(n)
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E-mail		Onze referentie	Brussel
		KAB 11118	04 JULI 2017

Betreft : Uw brief van 13 juni 2017

Geachte Minister Schultz van Haegen,

Wij hebben uw brief goed ontvangen en hebben kennis genomen van de door u aangehaalde ontwikkelingen en de in het Nederlandse parlement aangenomen motie.

Het Federaal Agentschap voor Nucleaire Controle heeft als missie om de gezondheid van de bevolking, de werknemers en het leefmilieu te beschermen tegen de negatieve effecten van ioniserende straling. Een missie die zij zeer ter harte neemt en waarvoor zij beschikt over een onafhankelijke, multidisciplinaire expertise

Het Agentschap zal niet aarzelen om bij de minste vaststelling van een mogelijk risico voor de bevolking, de werknemers of het leefmilieu, de haar toegewezen bevoegdheden te gebruiken om afdwingbare maatregelen op te leggen aan een exploitant.

De tekst van de motie toont aan dat er een blijvende nood is aan correcte en objectieve informatie. Dit bewijst nogmaals dat de begin vorig jaar versterkte samenwerking en informatie-uitwisseling tussen het FANC en de ANVS een goede zaak is. Ik sta vanzelfsprekend open voor alle initiatieven om deze samenwerking verder uit te bouwen.

Hoogachtend,

Jan Jambon

Vice-Eerste Minister
Minister van Veiligheid en Binnenlandse Zaken